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A Model to Explain Microfranchising in Bottom of
the Pyramid Markets
Robert]. Jensen'
Chris Sutter"
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Microfranchising, an emerging business model in the developing
world, is dJ-ectively enhancing bottom of the pyramid markets
(BOP) or markets serving the poorest of the poor in developing
countries. This Article seeks to explain how and why
microfranchising has emerged as a business model in the developing
world. Approaching microfranchising from the perspective of the
franchisor, this Article proposes a model to determine when
microfranchising might present a viable option for firms seeking to
operate in BOP markets. l
This Article begins by defining microfranchising and discussing
various business environment factors that influence the emergence of
this relatively new phenomenon. The Article examines several case
studies identifYing how various companies throughout the
developing world have successfully negotiated their respective
nations' business environments to create successful microfranchises.
Based on the case studies, this Article will then propose a model
predicting that microfranchising will be an effective business model
when employment laws are overly rigid, contract enforcement is lax,
and tangible assets or specific knowledge that are not normally
available in the marketplace are needed for the micro franchisor to
distribute or produce its goods. In conclusion, this Article outlines
some of the factors for potential firms in this market to consider in
determining whether to enter BOP markets. Additionally, this
Article speculates that further research will follow this Article to test
the model set forth herein.

* Dr. jensen is a protessor at Brigham Young University's Marriott School of Business
in the Department of Organizational Leadership and Strategy.
** Ph.D candidate, Ohio State University; M.B.A., Marriott School of Business,
Brigham Young University (2009). The authors thank the Marriot School's Center t(lr
Economic Self Reliance t()r project fiJllding.
I. See C. K. Prahalad & Allen Hammond, Servinlf the World's Poor, Profitably, 80
HARV. BllS. REV. 48, 49 (2002).
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II. MICROFRANCHISING
As with traditional franchising, microfranchising seeks to
replicate 2 a successful business model. However, micro franchising
operates on a much smaller scale with start-up costs ranging from
$25 to $25,000. 3 Microfranchising frequently involves the pursuit of
social objectives, such as providing jobs, in addition to strictly forprofit models. 4 While microfinance provides initial capital to
individuals lacking credit and therefore lacking a means of securing
loans, microfranchising provides eXlstmg business models to
individuals who may not be natural entrepreneurs. s Microfranchising
provides a viable business model, an existing brand, business
training, and access to a formal supply chain and business support,
which drastically increases the odds of microenterprise success. 6 This
section will first discuss the emergence of the microfranchising
market, followed by a discussion of factors impacting the business
environment of the developing world.

A. Factors Explaining the Emergence of Microfranchising
Microfranchising is a relatively recent phenomenon with the
majority of microfranchises emerging only in the last few years.
Several factors may explain this emergence in relation to economic
globalization. With increasing pressure on developing economies to
lower trade barriers and reduce bureaucratic restrictions, increased
contact with western economies may help promote an.d standardize

2. Replication involves the geographic copying of a business model, such as the spread
of a franchise model. For an exploration of the tactors affecting the successful replication of
business models, see lIenerally Sidney G. Winter & Gabriel Szulanski, Replication as StratellY,
12 ORG. SCI. 730, 730-43 (2001); Robert Jensen & Gabriel Szulanski, Stickiness and the
Adaptation of Orllanizational Practices in Cross-Border Knowledlle Transfers, 35 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. S08, S08-23 (2004); Robert Jensen & Gabriel Szulanski, Template Use and the
Effectiveness of Knowledlle Transfer, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1716, 1716-30 (2007); Gabriel Szulanski
et aI., When and How Trustworthiness Matters: Knowledl!e Transfer and the Moderatill<q EfJect of
Causal Ambiquity, 15 ORC;. SCI. 600, 600-13 (2004); Gabriel SZlilanski & Robert Jensen,
Presumptive Adaptation and the EffectiJ'eness of Knowlet{qe Tranrfer, 27 STRATEGIC MC;,\\T. J.
937,937-57(2006).
3. JASON FAIlUlOURNE ET AL., MICROI'RANCHISINC;: CREATING WEALTH AT THE
BOTTOM 01' THE PYRAMID 8 (2007).
4. Lisa Jones Christensen, Alleviatin,-q Poverty Usinll Microfranchisinll Modelr.· Case
Studies and a Critique, in ALLEVIATlNC; POVERTY THR(HIl;H BUSINESS STRAn:c;y 149, 152
(Charles Wankel ed., 2008).
S.Id.atI51-52.
6. FAIRBOURNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 34-3S.
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business practices across the world.?
In the past decade, the growth and success of microfinance has
redefIned perceptions about doing business in BOP markets. s Only a
few decades ago, most financial firms were reluctant to fund
microflnance projects or groups financing such ventures. However,
in February of2008, TIAA-CREF (a U.S. pension fund) and APB (a
Dutch pension fund) committed $125 Million USD to Catalyst
Microtlnance Investors in a private equity fund that will primarily
help microflnance firm ASA International expand throughout Africa
and Asia. 9 This move is indicative of a new readiness in capital
markets to pay attention to developing markets.
Perhaps a more profound phenomenon has been the
legitimization of the BOP as a viable market.]() As globalization
connects the world in new ways, new markets have been created and
developing markets have become increasingly important. II
Multinational corporations (MNCs) that previously had no interest
in BO P markets have responded to growing pressure to find new
markets and expand operations as competition for existing markets
has intensified. As a result, the four billion people on this earth with
an income of less than $2,000 per year-known as the bottom of the
pyramid-that were previously ignored have now caught the
attention of a growing number of management scholars and
MNCs. 12 These scholars argue that the poor of the world constitute
a market that is grossly underserved. 13 They contend that as MNCs
profitably engage the developing world, MNCs will expand their
own markets, while improving the quality of life of the poor through
supplying much-needed products and services. 14 However, little
research identifies exactly how MNCs can best enter BOP markets or

7. See STUART L. HART, CAPITALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: THE UNLIMITED
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN SOLVING THE WORLD'S MOST DIHICULT PROBLEMS 3 (2005).
S. See Christensen, supra note 4, at 149-70.
9. He-ather Dale, Microjinance Investments, GLOllAL PENSIONS, Feb. 13, 200S,
aFailable at http://w\\.\\..giobaipensions.com/giobai-pensions/news/14615S1/microtlnanceinvestmcnts?page=gp_dispiay _news&tempPageId=70 1266.
10. HART, supra note 7, at 135.
II. Id.
12. Id.; see afso Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I, at 49; V. KASTURI Rll.NGAN ET
At., BUSINESS SOLUTIONS "OR THE GLOBAL POOR: CREATING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
VALUE I (2007).
13. RANGAN ET At., supra note 12.
14. See HART, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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which organizational model ensures a successful entry. IS
Successfully serving BOP markets will require defYing pervasive
assumptions of the market and initiating innovative business
models. 16 Traditional theories of business operations have generally
been formulated in the context of the economically advanced
nations-i.e., those with adequate infrastructure and stable
conditions. Business environment factors often prevalent in the
developing
world-corruption,
deficient
legal
institutions,
inadequate infrastructure, and widespread povert/ 7-preclude
traditional marketing approaches to BOP markets. Given the
contrasting conditions of the developing world's business
environment, current theory and practice do not adequately explain
the best way to operate in BOP markets. While microfranchising may
provide an effective model for businesses operating in the BOP, most
microfranchising literature addresses only potential advantages for
the microfranchisees and not the franchisors. IX Clearly, a model is
needed to explain the conditions in which microfranchising might
present a viable option for firms seeking to operate in BOP markets.

B. Factors in the Developing World that Inhibit
Traditional Business Models
To understand the role of microfranchising, it is essential to
understand the business environment of the developing world. In
many ways, developing nations can be extremely difficult places to
do business. Microfranchising emerged, in large part, from its success
in addressing the traditionally problematic characteristics of the
business environment in BOP markets. Various factors that affect the
business environment in developing nations do not seem to affect
more developed nations, at least not to the same degree.
A general exploration of these factors will aid in understanding
the model that will be set forth below, though the application of
these factors can vary markedly from one area to the next. The

l5. See v. KASTURI I~NGAN & ROHITHAIU l~JAN, UNILEVER IN INDIA: HINDl!STAI':
LEVER'S PROJECT SHAKTI-MARKETINl; FMCG TO THE RURAL CONSUMER l-30 (HARV.
Bus. SCH. 2005).
l6. See Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I.
l7. BOP markets encompass over 4 billion people and are characterized by deep poverty
defined as an annual income of less than $2,000 USD a year. Many people in BOP markets live
on less than $200 USD a year. [d. at 49, 51.
l8. See FAIlUlOURNE ET AL., supra note 3 (t()(using exclusively on the bendits of
microfranchising f(,r the microfranchisees).
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developing world is hardly a homogenous block of nations, but is a
highly heterogeneous group, comprised of differentiated nations
with unique cultures, languages, environments, governments, and
people. Even within their own borders, developing nations are hardly
homogeneous. Furthermore, socia-economic conditions vary widely
within each nation, including areas dominated by upper and middle
class populations, as well as areas of extreme poverty. This Article
focuses on BOP markets within the multiplicity of developing
nations.
The following paragraphs outline several factors affecting the
microfranchise business model in developing nations. While this list
may be neither comprehensive nor uniformly applicable, it illustrates
contextual diHerences between developed and developing nations. In
many cases, these environmental conditions limit the growth of
traditional tlrms in developing countries, creating a landscape in
which a few powerful and well-connected tlrms dominate while the
rest of the economic activity takes place in simple market
transactions.]lJ Understanding the context of the business
environment in the developing world will increase the ability of tlrms
to operate in these environments, regardless of their specitlc business
model.
1. Poverty
Perhaps the detlning characteristic of the developing world is
poverty. As evidenced in Figure 1 below, the disparity between the
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in BOP markets and that of
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD/o member nation markets is startling. Poverty stifles two
fundamental ingredients necessary for the development of traditional
fIrms. First, the vast majority of people in poverty-stricken nations do
not have access to capital to start businesses or to contribute to
economic development. Financing is often not available in
developing countries, especially to individuals mired in poverty.
While microcredit has drastically improved individual lives in
developing countries, it has only served millions out of an estimated

19. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Eme~lJing
Markets' An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 867 (2000).
20. The OEeD is an international organization with membership consisting primarily of
developed nations in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. See generally
http://www.occd.org.
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four billion people in BOP markets. 2 ! Second, individuals in poverty
generally lack opportunities for education, which is directly linked to
productivity.22 Individuals lacking knowledge and experience have
greater difficulty successfully starting a profitable business of any
significant size.
Lack of access to education and capital directly affects the day to
day operations, and therefore the viability, of businesses from BOP
markets. For example, a firm operating in BOP markets often cannot
rely on traditional market mechanisms to provide suppliers or
distributors because individual entrepreneurs who would normally
fill those roles do not have access to the education and capital
necessary to create those businesses. Establishing a tlrm of sufficient
size to be a supplier or distributor to an incoming multinational firm
often requires at least a modicum of financing. With poverty rates in
BOP markets at subsistence levels, even minor financing is often not
available and microcredit, when available, is typically not enough to
provide the kind of supply or distribution services MNCs require. 23

$45,000.00
$40,000.00
$35,000.00
$30,000.00
$25,000.00
$20,000.00
$15,000.00
$10,000.00
$5,000.00
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Figure 1: Comparison of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.

24

21. Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I, at 48, 49; Press Release, United Nations, IT;\)
Launches International Year of Microcrcdit 2005, U.N. Doc. DEY /2492 (Nov. 18, 2004 l,
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/dev2492.doc.htm.
22. See George Psacharopoulos, Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update,
22 WOR.LD DEY. 1325, 1325-43 (1994).
23. See Christensen, supra note 4, at 149-70.
24. World Rank Group, Doing Business Topic: Economy Characteristics,
http://www.d(lingbusiness.(lrg/Expl(lreEC<)J1(lmics/Ec()J1(lmyCharacteristics.aspx (last visited
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2. Corruption
Corruption, or the abuse of power for personal or collective gain,
is a major hindrance to developing economies. 25 Corruption is most
common at the interface between public and private entities,
especially when the government must provide necessary services,
permits, or licenses. 26 Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures often
increase corruption, as each point of contact with an official is an
additional opportunity to solicit a bribe.27 As Figure 2 below
demonstrates, while corruption exists to some degree in all countries,
extreme corruption is commonplace in developing countries.
Corruption substantially increases the cost of transactions and
inHates prices through market distortions and inefficiencies, thereby
exacting a heavy toll on the economy.2X These procedures tend to
force businesses out of the formal economy and into informal
markets 2 l) where business occurs with less regulatory oversight.

100%
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40%
20%
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r

Figure 2: Corruption Comparison Graph.
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Aug. 21, 2009).
25. Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh, Introduction: An Overview of the Costs of
Corruption and StratcHies to Deal With It, in CURBIN(; COIUUJPTION: TOWARD A MODEL fOR
RllILDING NATIONAL INTE(;IUTY 1,1 (Rich Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds., 1999).
26. [d. at 3.
27. See id. at 2-3.
28. Stapenhurst & Kpundeh, supra note 25, at 3-4.
29. Int()rmal markets are markets t()r any type of product in which transactions are not
taxed or regulated by the government. Other terms t()r int()rmal market transactions include
"off the book," or "under the table" transactions. In emerging economies, as much as 60% of
the labor t()rce operates in int()rmal markets. Enrique Ghersi, The Informal Economy in Latin
America, 17 CATO J. 99, 101-02 (1997).
Rank
30. World
Group,
Enterprise
Surveys
Topic:
Corruption,
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3. Employment Law
Establishing employment regulations requires careful balance
between the need to protect workers' rights and the need for a
flexible and responsive labor force. Overly rigid labor laws may result
in reduced job creation, lower productivity, and increased
unemployment. 31 In Figure 3 below, for example, the costs of
dismissing workers in developing countries is often more than one
year's salary-more than double the cost in OEeD nations. The
developing world is often characterized by overly rigid labor laws
affecting hiring, working hours, and dismissals, which force workers
into the informal market where no protections exist. 32 The
characteristics of labor laws directly affect the costs associated with
operating a traditional firm.

• Cost of dismissing workers
(weeks of salary)

Figure 3: Relative Cost of Terminating Employment.

33

4. Contract Enforcement
Contract enforcement is a crucial element in understanding how
firms are structured. In the absence of a reliable legal system
enforcing contract obligations, businesses are unlikely to partner
with individuals or organizations they do not know or trust, thus

Imps:/ /www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreTopics/?topicid=3 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
31. WORLD BANK, D(llNl; BUSINESS 2009: COM I'AIU Nl; REl;ULATION IN 181
ECONOMIES 19-20 (2008).
32. Id. at 20.
33. World
Bank
Group,
Doing
Business
Topic
Employing
Workers,
http://www.d()ingbusiness.()rg/Expl()reT()pics/Empl()yingW()rkers/.
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limiting opportunity for increased connections and growth. 34 The
data in the chart below demonstrate that contract enforcement in
many developing nations requires considerable time and money,
effectively preventing the poorer segments of the population a legal
remedy to resolve contract disputes. 35 Unreliable enforcement
systems, which ofter limited options for recovery from a breach of
contract, deter larger businesses. 36 Firms who contract with
individuals from BOP markets may also find it nearly impossible to
locate the individuals if they walk away with firm assets, making it
difficult to operate tlrms in BOP markets using a traditional business
model involving employers and employees.
Enforcing Contracts
Region or Econom'l
OECD
Bangladesh
Ghana
Guatemala
India
Kenya

Procedures

Cost (% of claim)

30.8
41
36
31
46
44

18.9

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200

63.3
23
26.5
39.6
26.7

• Enforcing Contracts-to resolution duration

o

Figure 4: Effect of Lax Contract Enforcement.

37

34. See WORLD BANK, supra note 31, at 49.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. World Bank Group, Doing Business Topic: Ent(>rcing Contracts, http://
w\\w.doingbusiness.()rg/ExploreTopics/Enf()rcingContracts/ (last visited Aug. 21,2009).
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5. Infrastructure
BOP markets lack the infrastructure required by firms in
traditional markets. Developing countries often lack adequate
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, electricity, airports,
and communication systems. Even countries that have good
infrastructure in more developed areas may lack the same in areas of
greater poverty. Therefore, firms face distribution and production
challenges as they attempt to build their presence in these areas.
Figure 5 below shows costs incurred due to poor infrastructures.

12%

i

'1~ 1. ,I ,I,I ,I ,II

• Value lost due to
power 0 utages (% of
sales)

Figure 5: Comparison of Infrastructure Related CostS.

3X

C. Microfranchising Case Studies

In light of these contextual factors, we examine case studies to
better understand how microfranchising allows certain businesses to
succeed at the bottom of the pyramid in the developing world. The
following case studies provide insights into why firms entering BOP
markets would choose microfranchising as an operational business
model.

38. World
Bank
Group,
Enterprise
Surveys
Topic:
Intrastructure,
https:!/\\'ww.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreTopics/?topicid~8 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
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1. Igloo Ice Cream: Dhaka) Bangladesl1'9

Igloo Ice Cream is the largest producer and distributor of ice
cream in Bangladesh. It is a subsidiary of Abdul Monem Ltd., one of
the largest conglomerates in the country.40 Bangladesh is a
developing nation with a population of nearly 150 million and a land
area roughly the size of Iowa. 41 As of 2007, the GNI per capita
(Atlas method) was USD $470. 42
As indicated in Figures 1 through 5 above, Bangladesh lacks
adequate infrastructure, suffers heavily from corruption, and ranks
178 out of 181 economies in contract enforcement. 43 In addition,
while the labor laws are reasonably flexible regarding hiring and
working hours, dismissals cost businesses the equivalent of 104
weeks of salary per incident. 44 These factors cause Igloo to use a
flexible market governance structure, characterized by traditional
stores as well as trolleys that operate as franchisees of Igloo's
products in normally inaccessible areas.
Igloo primarily distributes its products through local stores. In
addition, Igloo operates in public areas such as parks and recreational
areas. Igloo has developed a successful microfranchise distribution
model to distribute their product in these areas. The
microfranchisees utilize a large tricycle, called a trolley, with an
insulated container for ice cream. The trolley is equipped with a large
umbrella and bears the Igloo brand name. Each trolley is owned by
Igloo and costs 60,000 Bangladeshi Taka (Tk), or nearly $900 USD,
an amount almost double the yearly GNI per capita. 45 Trolley
operators generally come from the poorer segments of society and

39. Int(>nnation t()r this case study came trom observation, interviews with numerous
Igloo microfranchisees in June 2007 and June 2008, as well as an interview with the Dhaka
manager of Igloo, Md. Mazidul Hoq, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, June 2008. Chris Sutter, Notes
from Personal Observation of Igloo Icc Cream in Dhaka, Bangladesh (June 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on tile with author).
40. See Abdul Monem Ltd. Company Profile, (2009), http://www.amlbd.com/
profile .php.
41. CIA, THE WORLD FACTllOOK: BANGl.ADESH (2009), Imps://www.cia.gov/
Ii brar), / pll b lications / the-we )rld -t'lCtb()( )k/ gel )s/bg.html.
42. WORLD BANK, BANL;[.ADESH AT A GLANCE (2008), available at
http://devdata.w()rldbank.org/AAG/bg(Laag.pdf
43. WORLD BANK, supra note 31, at 49.
44. Id. at 90.
45. For comparison purposes, the GNI per capita in the United States in 2008 was
$47,580. WORLD BANK, GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2008, at 1 (2009), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf.
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lack the necessary capital to purchase and operate their own business.
To bring the franchise into reach of the franchisees, Igloo accepts a
franchise fee of Tk 5,000-6,000 (around $100 USD) for the right to
use a trolley and operate the business. This fee guarantees that the
franchisee will be responsible for the care of the trolley. In fact, the
$100 franchise fee may be facilitated by microcredit, as that sum is
generally beyond the means of most operators.
Each trolley operator is assigned a different geographic location.
Each morning, the trolley operators buy that day's ice cream at a
distribution center, and then return to their areas to sell the product.
While pricing is theoretically fixed by Igloo, prices sometimes vary
because trolley operators adjust pricing based on demand. Other
aspects of the business model, such as product line and advertising,
are fixed. The trolley operators' benefit from Igloo's advertising and
from the geographic monopoly they enjoy. Trolley operator turnover
is high each rainy season when sales decline substantially, but there is
a large pool of potential candidates to draw from and finding new
operators is never a significant challenge.

2. FanMilk: Accra, Ghana46
FanMilk, based in Accra, Ghana, utilizes a model similar to
Igloo's; however, Ghana suffers less from corruption and enjoys
greater contract enforcement and more flexible employment laws
than Bangladesh. Poverty is widespread in Ghana, with the average
GNI per capita (Atlas method) at $590 in 2007. 47 In contrast to
Igloo whose microfranchise model only supplements its primary
store front approach, FanMilk relies entirely on microfranchising to
distribute its product. Fan Milk's emphasis on selling only in BOP
markets, such as slums and busy streets rather than also targeting
wealthier areas as Igloo does by distributing through storefronts may
account for this difference.
FanMilk's microfranchisees use a tangible asset-in this case a
bicycle with an insulated box attached-to deliver the product.
Microfranchisees are not used as a means of acquiring resources.
Instead, microfranchisees pay a franchise fee (which is less than the
46. Inf(mnation fe)r this case study came from observation as well as two rounds of
interviews with a majority of FanMilk microfranchisees in Accra, Ghana, May-June 2007, and
May-June 2008. S. Stevenson, Notes from Personal Observations and Interviews of FanMilk
Microtranchisees in Accra, Ghana (Sept. 2(08) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
47. WORLD
BANK,
GHANA
AT
A
,;LANCE
(2008),
al'ailable
at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/gha_aag.pdf
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value of the asset) and in turn receive the right to use a company
bicycle with an insulated box and operate the business. The business
models for how to operate the individual ice cream franchise are
fixed and significant adaptation does not occur at the
microfranchisee level. The microfranchisees are not assigned a
unique geographic area, but rather enter the areas they know best
and in which they are likely to be most successful.

3. Honey Care) rural Kenya 4H
Honey Care Africa provides an example of when both specific
knowledge and tangible assets (like Igloo and FanMilk) are needed
to create a production base. Honey Care is a company that utilizes
rural Kenya as a supply base for honey and then markets the honey
locally as well as internationally.49 Similar to Ghana, Kenya enjoys
relatively strong contract enforcement, but suffers from corruption
and poor infrastructure (see Figures 1 through 5 above). In 2007,
Kenya had a GNI per capita of$690 (Atlas method).50
Men and women applying to be microfranchisees need not only
tangible assets (beehives), as with Igloo and FanMilk franchisees, but
also specific knowledge on bee keeping. Honey Care provides
individuals with these tangible assets and specialized knowledge
through microfranchising. The beekeepers obtain a loan from a local
microfinance institution or NGO and use that capital to purchase the
hives. 51 Honey Care differs from Igloo and FanMilk because Honey
Care requires beekeepers to purchase the necessary assets (the
beehives) rather than simply leasing the tangible assets. 52 Honey
Care does this to create "a real sense of ownership" on the part of
the farmers. 53 Given the relatively low cost of the hives, these
requirements do not seem to reflect a strategy to compensate for
resource scarcity on the part of Honey Care. Honey Care partners
with local NGOs to provide essential training on beekeeping to
microfranchisees, which increases standardization of production

48. FAIRBOI 'RNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 149-63.
49. Id. at 150.
BANK,
KENYA
AT
A
GLANCE
50. WORLD
http://devdata.w()rldbank.()rg/AAG/ken_~lJg.pdf
51. FAIRBOURNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 154.

(2008),

available

at

52. Id.
53. Id.at 159.
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processes. 54 The microfranchising structure allows for the transfer of
knowledge as well as the assets necessary to produce honey.55
4. Community Enterprise Solutions, Rural Guatemala56
Community Enterprise Solutions (Sol Com) is a social venture
based in Antigua, Guatemala and serves rural commumties
throughout the country. In 2007, Guatemala had a GNI per capita
of $2,440, but income distribution is highly skewed, with the lowest
20% holding only 3.5% of the income share in 2000. 57
SolCom provides numerous products that increase the standard
of living for rural Guatemalans, including reading glasses, sunglasses,
eye drops, emcient light-bulbs, and water filters. The products are
first shipped to headquarters in Antigua and then to regional centers
where regional managers are employed. Regional managers oversee
asesores or salespeople who work in pairs in assigned areas and
operate as microfranchisees. These salespeople are independent from
the parent company, but wear uniforms, work in assigned areas,
receive training, and sell only Sol Com products. They conduct sales
campaigns generally lasting two days and solicit SolCom's most
popular item-reading glasses-by administering free eye exams.
Salespeople are trained every six months on how to administer the
exams as well as on other aspects of the business. Salespeople work
on commission and do not provide an upfront microfranchise fee to
SolCom. As is the case for the microfranchises previously examined,
Sol Com microfranchisees do not require tangible assets to facilitate
the sale of their products. In this case, the microfranchise structure is
used primarily as a way to transmit knowledge, coordinate activities,
and provide access to a formal supply chain, while preserving the
independence of salespeople.

54. Id. at 150.
55. Id. at 155-56.
56. Int<mnation t<lr this case study came trom observation and interviews with a
majority of Community Enterprise Solutions microtranchisees in rural Guatemala, June-July
2008. Jason Fairbourne, Notes trom Personal Observation of Community Enterprise Solutions
in Guatemala (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on tile with author).
57. WORLD BANK, GUATEMAl.A COUNTRY DATA PROI'ILE (2008), http://ddpext.worldbank.org/ ext/ ddpreportsjViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_I Ih 13609& REQ
UESLTYPE= VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&D IMENSI 0 NS=20.
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D. A Model to Explain Microfranchising at the Bottom of the Pyramid
The following section utilizes the three case studies discussed
above to develop a model to explain the incidence of
microfranchising in BOP markets. While microfranchising can
mitigate some detrimental environmental factors-such as
employment laws, contract enforcement, lack of access to financing,
and lack of access to education---others are more difficult to allay.
A country's employment laws have a profound effect on a firm's
choice of business model. The high cost of firing an employee deters
companies from casually entering employment arrangements, so
firms either avoid such markets or select alternative business models
that require fewer employees. In addition, rigid employment laws in
many developing countries increase the cost of traditional firm
operations, pushing firms toward other business models. In cases
where a country's employment laws inhibit a firm from hiring
employees, microfranchising offers an alternative form of
governance, giving the firm a more t1exible position. oX
Contract enforcement issues may also lead a firm to choose
microfranchising as a business model. Where contract enforcement is
an issue, firms generally have two options: they may choose to use
simple contracts that arc unlikely to be breached, or they avoid
contracts altogether by resorting to a pure market approach.
Selecting microfranchising as a business model is choosing the first
option as microfranchising contracts are often simple and verbal.
Microfranchisees are often required to pay a franchise fee in order to
receive the right to operate company assets. Such a requirement
creates commitment and motivation on the part of the franchisee to
follow through with obligations to care for the company assets. If
the microfranchisee breaches these obligations, the parent firm
retains the franchise fee (which the company would otherwise return
upon termination of the arrangement). This simple approach
effectively overcomes the obstacles posed by a lack of contract
enforcement in the developing world.

58. A traditional tinn approach operates with employer/employee colltracts. A pure
market approach utilizes outside colltracrors t()r production and customer/distributors rather
than employees (i.e., a tirm outsources production to others who it then buys the product
trom and sells its products to distributors who turn around and sell to the end customer). A
microtranchise is a hybrid structure that uses quasi employees. They do not have traditional
employmellt colltracts and they own their tranchises, but they have at least some colltractual
obligations with the tinn. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Ozqanization: The
Analysis IIfDiscrete Structural AlternatiJ'es, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269,269-96 (1991).
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Poverty is another BOP market characterization that afFects a
firm's decision to adopt microfranchising as a business model.
Among very poor populations, capital to obtain assets is generally
unavailable. Therefore, a firm that requires tangible assets for the
production or distribution of its products will not be able to employ
purely market mechanisms for this purpose. Instead, these
corporations must extend their resources through employees or
some form of contracting with another party.
Selecting microfranchising as a business model in povertystricken countries is an appropriate solution to doing business for
several reasons. The costs of supervising employees who are using
company assets may be too high to maintain. While the scarcity of
employment options almost guarantees that employees will work
very hard, assets employed in distribution of products are of much
greater value than an employee's salary. Thus, there is an incentive
for the employee to simply take the asset and sell it or use it
elsewhere. Given the poor legal infrastructure, it would be nearly
impossible for the firm to recover the assets. To monitor every
employee as the employee uses the company's assets throughout
crowded markets and slums would be an unsustainable cost in most
circumstances. Many microfranchises avoid this problem by requiring
a franchise fee for the right to use company assets in the distribution
process. This fee is generally not equal to the actual value of the
assets because, as previously explained, the microfranchisees often
cannot access sufficient capital to obtain the assets. However,
payment of the fee generally provides enough incentive to prevent
theft or abuse of the company's assets. SY
Lack of access to the requisite knowledge or education to
perform efficient, quality work poses another obstacle to working
within BOP markets. For example, SolCom employs members of
local rural communities to perform eye exams and sell reading
glasses. 6o The knowledge to perform these tasks is not usually
available within these rural communities,61 necessitating something
closer to a more traditional business model while still ensuring a
commitment to a standardized business model. An untraditional
business model, such as microfranchising, may be an appropriate
59. This is not to suggest that dishonesty is a defining characteristic of the developing
world. Indeed, many industries in the developed world (car rental companies, tc)r example) use
the same practice to ensure that their assets are returned sately.
60. Fairbourne, supra note 56.
61. Id.
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approach to educating and preparing people to perform these tasks. 62
Microfranchising provides a model that allows for franchisee
commitment to standardization and training while minimizing costs.
Corruption and lack of infrastructure, however, are not easily
mitigated by microfranchising. Corruption and power outages affect
all business models. For this reason, these two contextual factors,
while important, are not included in the model predicting the use of
microfranchising.

Traditional Firms

Informal Markets

Rigid employment laws

Assets unavailable

Higher monitoring costs

Knowledge unavailable

/~
Microfranchising

'\.

/
Overcomes rigid employment laws

Allows for access to assets and/or

Lowers monitoring costs

knowledge

/

Figure 6: Striking the Balance Between a Traditional Business Model and
Informal Market Transactions.

III. CONCLUSION

Traditional business theory and practice do not account for key
environmental differences in the developing world. The emergence
of microfranchising is driven by tlve basic factors: (1) the existence of
rigid employment laws; (2) a lack of access to capital due to
widespread poverty and inadequate tlnancial institutions; (3) the
need to operate local units with assets that are valued at multiples of
a typical weekly or monthly wage; (4) a lack of education and
knowledge in local markets; and (5) inadequate legal institutions,
which makes the enforcement of labor contacts difficult and increases
the costs of monitoring employees.
62. See J. C. Spender, Makin<q /(nowlef{qe the Rasis ofa Dynamic Theory Iif'the Firm, 17
STRATEl;rc MGMT. J. (SPE< :J!\L ISSUE) 45, 46-47 (1996).
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Firms considering entry into BOP markets should consider the
following factors in determining whether to microfranchise. Firms
first need to consider the assets and level of knowledge necessary for
distribution or production of their products in relation to the relative
level of poverty of the target market. If these assets or knowledge do
not exist in the market, pure market transactions may be unsuccessful
because suppliers may be difficult to locate and independent
distribution channels may be difficult to establish. Firms should then
consider the target market's employment laws and its degree of legal
protection. Where employment laws are overly rigid, a hybrid model
such as microfranchising may be most appropriate because
terminating employees may be extremely costly. Where legal
protection is unavailable or insufficient, firms may also need to utilize
a microfranchise model that creates commitment and motivation in
its microfranchisees and safeguards firm assets from opportunistic
employees. Given the characteristics of the developing world,
microfranchising may provide an attractive model for many firms.
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